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Abstract
We focus on the dynamic relation between wage increases, promotions
and job changes. We relate our empirical analyses to the theoretical
model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999). In the empirical analyses
we use the Portuguese matched employer-employee data Quadros de
Pessoal. We conclude from finding significant serial correlation in
wage increases and promotion rates that employer learning about the
worker’s ability might be important. Furthermore, we find that the
Portuguese labor market is not competitive. Finally, we argue that
employer-reported promotion relate to a large extent to wage increases
rather than changes in job tasks and complexity.
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1 Introduction
Career development inside the firm is an important source of wage increases.
Topel and Ward (1992), for example, show that for young workers only about
one third of the wage increases can be attributed to job changes. This im-
plies that the most substantial part of the wage increases occurs inside the
firm. Wages can increase for many reasons while working in the same firm,
workers develop (firm’s specific) human capital, firms learn about workers’
productivity, etc. The internal labor market is characterized by a relatively
well defined hierarchy, which workers can climb. Promotions to higher hier-
archical levels are often associated with wage increases. In the internal labor
market other worker factors can be important than those that determine the
initial match between the worker and firm.
In this paper, we focus on the relation between wage increases, promo-
tions and job changes. In a dynamic framework, we investigate to what
extent promotions and job changes can be predicted by the past career path
and how promotions and job changes affect wage increases. We relate our
empirical results to the theoretical model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999).
This model explicitly deals with learning of the firm about the worker’s abil-
ity as explanation for promotions and wage increases. Our empirical results,
therefore, provide insight in the importance of learning for worker’s careers.
The model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) has more often been used
in empirical analyses of career mobility. Lluis (2005) estimates the model to
study career mobility in Germany. Her focus is on the underlying assump-
tions of the model and the role of comparative advantages. Lluis (2005)
considers four hierarchical levels and concludes in favor of job assignment
but does not find evidence that learning plays a role explaining the dynamics
of wages. Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2005) apply the model to
sector wage determination. Our approach differs from these papers in the
fact that both papers focus mainly on the underlying assumptions of the
model rather than investigating the model predictions.
In the empirical analyses we use the Portuguese matched employer-employee
data Quadros de Pessoal, which is based on an annual enquiry of all firms with
wage earners in the private sector. The data set contains detailed information
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on both firms and workers. The data contain the worker’s hierarchical level,
which is ranked by a well-defined hierarchy. Changes in the hierarchical level
are a measure for promotions. Additionally, the firm reports if the worker
has been promoted in the past year. In the empirical analyses we use both
measures for promotions to investigate the extent to which the definition of
promotions is important.
In the theoretical literature a promotion is considered to be a change in
hierarchical level accompanied by a change in the worker’s production tech-
nology (e.g. Bernhardt, 1995; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). Prendergast
(1993) defines hierarchical levels in terms of how demanding they are for
human capital, while Manove (1997) defines hierarchical levels by the degree
of worker’s responsibility. In the empirical literature not much attention has
been devoted to the definition of promotions. A substantial share of the
empirical work considers only one single firm, which has the advantage of
having a clear hierarchy in jobs. Still even within a single firm the hierarchy
in jobs is not always obvious. Lazear (1992) defines promotions as move-
ments from a job title with a lower average pay to a job title with a higher
average pay, while Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) use yearly patterns
of job transitions to infer promotions. More recently Treble, Van Gameren,
Bridges and Barmby (2001) use the hierarchy defined by the firm with 14
levels and Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) use records of one firm which include
information on every job change for every employee, including promotions
categorized by the personnel department. Individual-based data face the
problem of having to rely on subjective promotion concepts, e.g. workers
might associate promotions to wage increases rather than to changes in the
hierarchy. McCue (1996) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, where
the definition of promotions is based on position changes reported by re-
spondents. Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003) use the British Household
Panel Survey, where also the timing of promotions and type of job change
is reported by the workers. Pergamit and Veum (1999) show the sensitivity
of empirical results on job assignments and wage increases to different pro-
motion definitions. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth they
conclude that for a substantial fraction of the individuals a promotion does
not mean a change of position. Overall, after a self-reported promotion about
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30% of the workers remains to perform the same tasks as before.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some theory
concerning promotions and wage increases, and we provide our empirical
specifications. From the theoretical literature, we take some predictions that
we test in our empirical analyses. Section 3 provides a detailed description
of the data. In Section 4 we present our empirical results. Section 5 provides
sensitivity analysis of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The economic literature on promotions is driven by a number of stylized facts
(e.g. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994a, b). Promotions are often asso-
ciated with large wage increases. Promotions are, therefore, not only used
to assign workers to jobs, but can also act as incentives structures to work-
ers. However, wage increases at promotions are small relative to differences
between averages wages across hierarchical levels. Both wage increases and
promotions are often found to be serially correlated. Large wage increases
during a stay at one hierarchical level often predict promotions to the next
hierarchical level. The final stylized fact is that real wage decreases are not
rare, but demotions are.
Most of the recent theoretical frameworks take these stylized facts as point
of departure for modeling the role of promotions inside firms. For example,
Owan (2004) and Costrell and Loury (2004), who focus more on the impor-
tance of promotions in assigning workers, and Kwon (2006), who considers
promotions in the contexts of optimal contracts and incentives for human
capital accumulation. Bernhardt (1995) developed a model that includes hu-
man capital accumulation, job assignment and asymmetric learning. In this
framework workers develop general and firm specific skills and the ability
of these workers is only observed by the current employer. Firms have two
hierarchical levels called labor and management, and more able workers have
a comparative advantage in management. The model of Bernhardt (1995)
predicts that wage increases at promotions are large and these wage increase
may be small relative to the difference in average wages between hierarchical
levels. However, this model fails to explain that wage increases predict pro-
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motions and the serial correlation in promotion rates and wage increases is
not addressed. The model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) performs better
in explaining the stylized facts. Their model considers symmetric learning by
workers and firms, which we use as starting point for our empirical analyses.1
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) consider two types of workers with (unob-
served) innate ability θ. Firms do not know in advance if a worker is of high
or low ability, but while working both the worker and firm learn about the
worker’s innate ability. The worker’s effective ability ηt at time t depends
on the innate ability θ and the current level of the worker’s labor market
experience xt. In particular, ηt = θf(xt), where f(·) is a concave function.
A worker, who is assigned to hierarchical level j, produces according to the
technology yjt = dj + cj(ηt+ εt), where cj and dj are known constants and εt
are idiosyncratic shocks, which may be aggregate or person-specific produc-
tivity variations.
The existence of the productivity shocks introduce noise in the out-
put produced. The worker’s output in each period provides a signal zt =
(yjt− dj)/cj = ηt+ εjt. The model specification causes that both the worker
and the firm only learn gradually about the worker’s innate ability and that
learning is independent of the job assignment, θet = E[θ|zt−x, ..., zt−1]. Gib-
bons and Waldman (1999) impose some regularity conditions on cj and dj
and show that a worker is promoted to the next hierarchical model if the
expected effective ability ηet = θ
e
tf(xt) increases some threshold η
j. Gibbons
and Waldman (1999) assume that learning about the worker’s ability is not
exclusive to the current employer, but all labor market participants have ac-
cess to the same information. Wages are determined on a competitive market
and equal expected output wjt = E[yjt] = dj + cjθ
e
tf(xt).
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) distinguish two cases; symmetric learning
where both the worker and firm learn about the worker’s innate ability, and
full information where the innate ability is always known to both the worker
and firm. Under full information past realizations of the worker’s produc-
tivity are not informative on the worker’s innate ability. Wage increases
are therefore only the consequence of increased work experience and pro-
motions. High ability workers accumulate effective ability at a higher rate,
1See Gibbons and Waldman (2006) for an extension of their earlier model.
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which causes serial correlations in wage increases. However, conditional on
the worker’s innate ability serial correlation in wage increases is absent. Un-
der symmetric learning even after conditioning on the worker’s innate ability,
past realizations of the worker’s productivity remain important. Condition-
ing on the true worker’s innate ability is, therefore, not sufficient to remove
the serial correlation in wage increases. Workers who experience large wage
increases are also more likely to be promoted as firms believe these are high
innate ability workers. These workers also spend less time in a hierarchical
level before being promoted to the next level. This causes that wage increases
predict promotions and that promotions are serially correlated. Testing for
symmetric learning thus implies distinguishing between heterogeneity among
workers and true state dependence in promotions and in wage increases. Gib-
bons andWaldman (1999) assume a competitive labor market, where all firms
learn at the same rate. This implies that both in case of full information and
symmetric learning, there is no wage premium of changing employers.
We test these predictions using reduced-form model specifications. Since
the model predictions are informative on wage increases, we specify our em-
pirical wage equation in increases in levels. Under the null hypothesis of
full information in a competitive market, wage increases only depend on the
worker’s innate ability θi, the level of labor market experience xit, whether
or not a promotion occurred pit and the worker hierarchical level hit. If there
is symmetric learning, there is serial correlation in wage increases, implying
that after controlling for the factors mentioned above and the wage level
wit−2, the wage increases wit − wit−1 and wit−1 − wit−2 are correlated. The
reason for conditioning on the wage level wit−2 is to control for all infor-
mation already revealed to the market about the worker’s innate ability. If
learning is not symmetric or the market is not competitive, there might be
a premium to switching employers even if the worker stays within the same
hierarchical level. We denote a separation from the current employer by sit.
Our empirical wage equation therefore follows
wit−wit−1 = β1(wit−1−wit−2)+β2wit−2+β3pit+β4sit+β5xit+g1(hit)+θi+εit.
where the function g1(hit) is a linear function including dummy variables
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for the hierarchical levels. If in a competitive labor market there is full
information, then β1 = 0, β2 = 0 and β4 = 0. Symmetric learning in a
competitive labor market implies β1 6= 0 and β4 = 0. And if learning is
either not symmetric or the labor market is not competitive, then β4 6= 0.
Under full information promotions depend only on the worker’s innate
ability, the level of labor market experience and the current hierarchical level.
If there is symmetric learning, there remains serial correlation in promotions
and promotions can be predicted by wage increases. In a competitive market
both under full information and under symmetric learning, the rate at which
promotions occur should not depend whether the worker recently changed
employer. Therefore, we specify for promotions the empirical model
pit = α1(wit−1−wit−2)+α2wit−2+α3pit−1+α4sit−1+α5xit+g2(hit)+ϕi+ ²i,t
In this model specification, full information implies α1 = 0, α2 = 0, α3 = 0
and α4 = 0. If in a competitive market there is symmetric learning, then α1 6=
0, α3 6= 0 and α4 = 0. And finally, if either the market is not competitive or
learning is not symmetric, then α4 6= 0.
Finally, in a competitive labor market with either full information or sym-
metric learning job separations should be unrelated to past wage increases
and whether or not recently the worker experienced a promotion. To model
job separations we use the specification
sit = γ1(wit−1 −wit−2) + γ2wit−2 + γ3pit−1 + γ4sit−1 + γ5xit + g3(hit) + ςi + ζit
In case other firms have the same information about the worker as the current
employer (full information or symmetric learning) and the labor market is
competitive, then the prediction is that γ1 = 0, γ2 = 0 and γ3 = 0. If any of
these variables is non-zero, the labor marker is not competitive or learning
is asymmetric.
In our empirical analyses, we will also try to include additional control
variables besides the variables already mentioned above. In particular, we
include the firm’s size (measured by the number of workers), year dummies
and sector indicators. These variables should control for the firm’s technolog-
ical function. In Section 4 we discuss the details of our estimation procedure
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and the empirical results.
3 Data
In the empirical analyses we use the Portuguese matched employer-employee
data set Quadros de Pessoal. These data are annually collected by the Min-
istry of Employment, based on a survey that every firm with wage earners has
to fill in. The data do not cover public administration, domestic service and
self-employed workers. The compulsory nature of the survey guarantees that
each year information for more than 2 millions workers is recorded. Quadros
de Pessoal provides information on individual characteristics such as gender,
age, schooling, occupation, tenure, earnings, and hours of work. Firm char-
acteristics include location, employment, sales, ownership, and legal setting.
Both firms and workers have identification codes that permit to track them
over time. For employers it is mandatory to post the firm’s response to the
survey questions concerning the information on employees in a public place
inside the firm. This should reduce measurement errors in the data.
In our empirical analyses we use data from 1991 to 2000. The data
are collected once per year. Until 1993 the data were collected in March.
After 1993 the data are collected in October. In the empirical analyses we
deal with this discrepancy by including year dummy’s. Furthermore, we
perform sensitivity analyses where we only consider the period after 1993.
We restrict the sample to full-time workers who were between 16 and 65
years old. In total the data contain 4,202,736 workers, who are observed
in 16,245,140 years, from which we use a 10% random sample. We have
done some consistency checks on the data. If we found an inconsistency
in the variables gender, birth date, tenure in the firm or school level, this
was repaired if possible or otherwise the worker was dropped from the data.
In total we excluded 183,932 observations for which we did not manage to
recover the correct values of the variables.
The data contain five components of monthly earnings, a base-wage,
tenure-indexed components, other regularly paid components, non-systematic
payments and extra-time work payments. As the relevant wages we take the
sum of the base-wage, the tenure-indexed components and the other regularly
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paid components. We do not take the other two components into account as
these are specific to the month in which the data were collected. The amounts
presented are before taxes and social security contributions and refer to Oc-
tober of each year (or March for the period 1991-1993). We have deflated the
wages using Consumer Price Index to constant (2000) PTE. To reduce mea-
surement errors in the wages we have excluded workers who experienced a
wage increase in top 10 percentile in one year and in the lower 10 percentile in
the next year (or vice versa). This implies a loss of 119,185 observations. The
remaining data set contains 363,383 individuals and 1,323,298 observations.
The Quadros de Pessoal contains three types of variables that reveal infor-
mation about workers’ mobility inside firm. Most detailed is the professional
category, which contains over 60,000 possible job descriptions. Since there
is no natural ranking in these job descriptions, using changes in professional
category as measure for promotions is not attractive. The second source of
information about workers’ mobility is the hierarchical level, which is based
on skills and tasks. The data distinguish eight hierarchical levels (full de-
scription in the Appendix) defined by law (Decreto-Lei n.o 121/78, 2 June):
(Level 1) apprentices, interns, trainees;
(Level 2) non-skilled professionals;
(Level 3) semi-skilled professionals;
(Level 4) skilled professionals;
(Level 5) higher-skilled professionals knowledge;
(Level 6) supervisors, team leaders, foremen;
(Level 7) intermediary executives;
(Level 8) top executives.
A promotion is defined as a movement from a lower to a higher hierarchical
level. To reduce misclassification in hierarchical levels, we have used the
information on the professional categories. Since the professional category
is much more detailed than the hierarchical level, we consider changes in
the hierarchical level that did not imply a change in professional category
as misclassifications. The final measure for worker’s mobility is the reported
date of most recent promotion. If the date of last promotion is posterior to
October of last year (or March for the period 1991-1993), we consider that
the worker was promoted. It should be stressed that it is the firm who reports
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this promotion date, which most likely reduces the level of subjectiveness in
what is considered to be a promotion.
Since we can track firms and workers over the years we are able to iden-
tify workers movements between firms. We define a separation as a worker
movement from one firm to another in two subsequent years. We use data
on tenure to control for misclassifications in separations.
In Table 1 we present some descriptive statistics of the data. The mean
monthly wage is 125,762 PTE, which is about 627 euro. Workers experience
on average an annual wage increase of 5329 PTE, which is 3.8% of the mean
wage. Approximately 7% of the workers change hierarchical level in two
subsequent years. However, the firms indicate that 11.2% of the workers got
promoted. The majority of the workers that got promoted, according to the
firm, do not change hierarchical level. Only 2% of all workers are promoted
according to the firm and change hierarchical level in the same year. This
suggests that both promotion concepts measure different movements within
the firm. Furthermore, about 4.4% of the individuals switch firms and 1.1%
of all workers move to a higher hierarchical level at the same time they switch
firms.
About 41% of the workers in our sample are female and they are on
average 36 years old. On average a worker has 8 years of tenure within the
current firm. The mean firm size is 30 workers. Almost half of the workers
are qualified professionals, which is the fourth hierarchical level out of eight
possible levels. Only about 3 percent of the workers are top executives, which
in the highest hierarchical level. Compared to other European countries,
the level of education in Portugal is low. About 42% of the workers only
completed four years of primary education, while only about 18% of the
workers finishes High school. Finally, we distinguish 18 sectors of economic
activity. The two biggest sectors are trade, and textile, clothing and leather
employing 18% and 17% of the workers, respectively.
Table 2 presents job mobility by gender and age group. We have catego-
rized the transitions into five different possibilities: no change; separation to
the same hierarchical level in another firm; separation to a higher hierarchical
level in another firm; promotion inside the firm to a higher hierarchical level;
and promotion inside the firm in the same hierarchical level. The latter type
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of promotions are based on the most recent promotion date reported by the
firm. The general picture does not differ much between men and women.
About 80% of the both men and women do not make a change. Men are
slightly more likely to switch employers, while women more often make a
transition inside the firm to a higher hierarchical level. Mobility declines as
workers get older. For the oldest age group most mobility comes from pro-
motions inside the same hierarchical level. A natural explanation that older
workers are less often promoted to higher hierarchical levels is that these
workers are already in the higher hierarchical levels and there are thus fewer
possibilities for increases.
McCue (1996) and Lluis (2005) have documented similar statistics for
workers’ mobility for respectively the US and Germany. Portugal has lower
separation rates than the US and Germany, which is particularly the case
for the younger inexperienced workers. Internal job mobility rates are much
higher in Portugal. However, this might also be caused by differences in the
definition of promotions. Both McCue (1996) and Lluis (2005) use data from
questionnaires to individuals and thus rely on self-reported position changes
by the workers. Furthermore, Lluis (2005) only distinguishes four hierarchical
levels, which naturally reduces mobility compared to our eight hierarchical
levels. McCue (1996) considers each self-reported position change by the
worker as a promotion, but there might still be some discrepancy between
worker and firm reported position changes.
Table 3 presents for each hierarchical level the average wage and some
measures for mobility. Except for level 6 (supervisors, team leaders and fore-
men), the average wage is higher for workers in higher hierarchical levels.
Workers in level 5 (higher-qualified professionals) are on average better edu-
cated than the workers in level 6, which might explain their higher average
wage. Workers in level 8 (top executives) earn on average more than 5 time
as much as the apprentices and trainees in level 1. Average wages particu-
larly start to increase beyond level 4 (qualified professionals). Recall from
Table 1 that less than 16% of the workers are ranked in hierarchical level 5
or higher.
As could be expected apprentices and trainees are most mobile. They
are most likely to be promoted to higher hierarchical levels, within the level
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or to switch employers. The likelihood of moving to a higher hierarchical
level decreases quickly until reaching level 4 and remains roughly the same
for higher hierarchical levels. Except for workers in the first level, all workers
have similar probabilities of being promoted within the hierarchical level and
to separate from the job.
Table 4 shows how workers move through hierarchical levels and the as-
sociated wage increases. Average wage increases associated to changes in
hierarchical level are always higher than average wage increases of the work-
ers who stay in the same level. In general average wage increases increase
in the number of hierarchical levels a worker is promoted. However, workers
are not very likely to skip hierarchical levels beyond the level of qualified
professionals (level 4).
4 Results
In this section we discuss the estimation results of the empirical models in-
troduced in Section 2. The empirical models follow the specification of a
dynamic panel data model and therefore we follow the approach of Arel-
lano and Bond (1991). After taking first-differences to eliminate the worker
specific fixed effects, the specifications include the endogenous regressors
(wit−1 − wit−2) − (wit−2 − wit−3), pit − pit−1 and sit − sit−1. As instruments
for these endogenous regressors we use wit−3, pit−1 and sit−1. The remaining
variables are treated as exogenous. We thus have as many instrumental vari-
ables as we have endogenous regressors, implying that our models are just
identified. The estimation method requires that we observe a worker’s wage
in four consecutive years (wit, . . . , wit−3). This implies that the empirical
analyses are done on a sample of 106,305 workers who are in total observed
in 659,497 years.
The theoretical model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) has labor market
experience as an important individual characteristic. However, the data do
not contain information on work experience. Therefore, we use the worker’s
age as proxy variable for work experience, we include both age and age
squared. Furthermore, we also include the worker’s tenure (and tenure
squared) as control variables in all model specifications. Finally, for each
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model specification we estimate the model both without and with firm size,
sector dummies and dummies for the different years of observation.
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the model of wage increases.
The first two columns use job transitions to a higher hierarchical level as
promotions, the last two columns use promotion dates reported by the em-
ployer as measure for promotions. From comparing the estimation results
in columns (1) and (2) with those in columns (3) and (4), we see that the
returns to a promotion reported by the employer are almost 30% higher than
the returns to a job transition to a higher hierarchical level. This raises the
suspicion that employers report wage increases as promotions rather than
changes in job tasks or responsibilities. A job transition to a higher hierar-
chical level raises the wage with on average about 6500 PTE, which is around
5% of the average wage in our data. Our estimate is in line with earlier empir-
ical work. McCue (1996) concludes that promotions account approximately
9% - 18% of within-firm wage growth over the life cycle. Booth, Francesconi
and Frank (2003) find a wage prize for promotion of around 5%. And Lima
and Pereira (2003) find, using the same data we use, for firms with more than
500 workers that a wage increase of 1.9% for a promotion inside the same
level, 4.9% for a job transition to a higher hierarchical level and 8.3% for a
job transition to a higher hierarchical level that coincides with an employer-
reported promotion.
We do find evidence for serial correlation in wage increases. Serial cor-
relation in wage increases (after controlling for individual heterogeneity) is
an indication for symmetric learning. The size of the serial correlation is
quite robust against the different measures for promotions and including ad-
ditional regressors. On average, a wage increase causes that in the next year
the worker gets an additional wage increase of about 10% of the previous
wage increase. The serial correlation in wage increases is one of the stylized
facts summarized by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994b) but has mixed
evidence in the empirical literature. Lluis (2005) did not find evidence of
serial correlation in wages while Gibbs and Hendriks (2004) and Dohmen
(2004) found some evidence of serial correlation in wages. Lluis (2005) uses
survey data with self-reported wages, measurement errors in wages may cause
a downward bias in the serial correlation in wage increases. Gibbs and Hen-
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driks (2004) and Dohmen (2004) do not suffer from this problem as both use
personnel records from a single firm.
The estimation results show that there are returns to switching employ-
ers. In all specifications there is a substantial wage premium associated to
a job separation. This wage premium is higher in specifications (3) and (4)
than in specifications (1) and (2). The main reason for this, is that if the
worker moves to a higher hierarchical level while switching employers, then in
specifications (1) and (2) it is recorded as both a promotion and a job sepa-
ration while in specification (3) and (4) it is only recorded as a job transition.
However, in all specification the wage premium associated to a job transition
to another employer is about 70% of the wage increase associated to a promo-
tion. The wage increases following a job separation remains unaffected after
correcting for the number of workers in a firm and sector dummies. Raw
statistics show that larger firms pay on average higher wages. Firm size and
the sector dummies can be interpreted as indicators for the firm’s production
technology. Indeed, as is shown in specifications (2) and (4) wage increases
are significantly larger in firms with more workers. This implies that the
wage increase after a job separation cannot be explained only from workers
moving to firms with better production technologies.
In Section 2 we discussed that in a competitive labor market, either with
full information or symmetric learning, there would not be any wage pre-
mium associated to switching employers. The significant and substantial
wage increase associated to a job separation thus indicates that the Por-
tuguese labor market is not competitive. Obviously, employers have some
bargaining power when determining wages, this might for example be due to
job search frictions.
The estimation results for the linear probability model that workers get
promoted are presented in Table 6. Wage increases do not forecast job tran-
sitions to a higher hierarchical level, i.e. in specifications (1) and (2) both
the most recent wage increase and the lagged wage level do not have a sig-
nificant impact on the probability to get promoted. In specifications (3) and
(4) these wage variables do have a positive effect on the probability that
the employer reports a promotion and in specification (3) both estimated
covariate effects are even significant. This provides again evidence that em-
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ployers report as promotions wage increases rather than changes in job tasks
or responsibilities. Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello (1999), who using data from
one Japanese firm, analyze promotions inside horizontal ranks, which do not
imply a change in job complexity or responsibilities. They find that wage
increases forecast promotions. Dohmen (2004) focusses on changes in hierar-
chical levels and concludes that the effect of wage increases on the promotion
probability disappears after include the controls for tenure, age, education
and performance evaluation. These finding coincide with our interpretation
that employer-reported promotions describe substantial wage increases rather
than changes in job tasks or responsibility.
In all specifications there is positive serial correlation in promotions, al-
though the coefficient of serial correlation is much larger in case promotions
are measures as job transitions to a higher hierarchical level. Workers who
switched employers have significantly lower probabilities to get promoted in
the next year. The impact of a job separation on the promotion probability
is more than twice as large in specification (3) and (4) as in specifications (1)
and (2). Recall from Section 3 that annually about 7% of the workers move
to a higher hierarchical level, while firms indicate that slightly over 11% of
the workers get promoted. So not only the absolute impact of a job separa-
tion of promotions is larger in specification (3) and (4), but also the impact
relative to the average annual promotion probability. Serial correlation in
promotion rates is one of the main findings in the empirical literature (e.g.
Seltzer and Merrett, 2000; and Treble, Van Gameren, Bridges and Barmby,
2001).
Both age and tenure have significant impacts on promotion probabilities.
Promotion rates in terms of job changes to higher hierarchical levels are
highest around age 52 and after 20 years of tenure. Promotion reported by
the employer are decreasing in age (during working life) and are lowest after
17 years of tenure. Firm size has an opposite impact on the two concepts for
promotions. In larger firms workers are significantly more likely to make a
job transition to a higher hierarchical level, while it is significantly less likely
that the employer reports a promotion.
Our third model describes job separations. The estimation results for
this linear probability model are given in Table 7. In all four specifications
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it holds that both wage increases and promotions forecast job separations.
This finding contradicts Sicherman and Galor (1990), who argue that worker
may separate from their job if their career path does not fulfill the worker’s
expected career path. Also Lazear (1999) predicts a negative correlation
between job separations and both promotions and wage increases. A possible
explanation for the positive correlation we find, is that in a market with
asymmetric information, both promotions and substantial wage increases can
be signals about the worker’s (unobserved) productivity. Other employers
may therefore make higher wage offers to these workers.
We find serial correlation in job separations, implying that workers who
recently moved employer are more likely to move again. Also age and tenure
have significant impacts on job separation rates. Young workers are most
mobile and the likelihood of switching employers decreases during working
life. Job separation rates are increasing in tenure until about 22 years of
tenure. Finally, in firms with more workers job separation rates are signifi-
cantly higher than in firms with less workers.
The main conclusions we can draw from these estimation results is that
most likely the Portuguese labor market is not competitive. There are sub-
stantial and significant impacts from job separations on both the probability
of getting promoted and on wage increases. The serial correlation in wages
and promotions indicates that learning is important. One might question
whether learning is symmetric as promotions and wage increases also fore-
cast job separations. Finally, it seems that promotions reported by employers
measure to a large extent wage increases rather than changes in job tasks
and responsibilities. The returns to these self-reported promotions are much
larger than the returns to job transitions to a higher hierarchical level.
5 Sensitivity analysis.
In this section we perform some additional analyses to investigate the ro-
bustness of our empirical results. In the tables we only report the estimation
results of the most extensive models, i.e. those including the number of
workers, sector and year dummies as covariates.
Recall that until 1993 the data were collected in March, while from 1994
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onwards the data were collected in October. It might be that between the
1993-wave and the 1994-wave more promotions and wage increases occurred
due to the extended time period. This might bias our parameter estimates.
Therefore, as a first sensitivity check we have estimated our models only
using the data collected after 1993. In the model for wage increases the
relevant coefficients increase slightly (see Table 8). The serial correlation
in wage increases becomes larger as are the returns to promotions and job
separations. In particular, the wage premium from a job separation increases
with about 35% compared to the earlier estimates. Finally, the covariate
effect of the number of workers almost doubles. The estimation results for
the promotion probability and the job separation rate do not change much
(see Tables 9 and 10). We only find that the effect of the number of workers
changes somewhat. The main conclusions from the previous section remain
valid. The Portuguese labor market is not competitive, there is some evidence
for learning and both promotion concepts differ substantially in what they
measure.
Next we perform separate analyses for men and women. The idea is the
men and women might sort into different types of occupations or jobs and
that therefore their promotion opportunities differ. The estimated coeffi-
cients in the model for wage increases differ substantially between men and
women (see Table 11). State dependence in wage increases is only present
for men. Furthermore, the returns to both a promotion or a job separation
are much larger for men than for women. The results for the promotion
rates do not differ much between men and women. If we focus on changes in
hierarchical levels only the negative effect of a job separation on promotion
rates is larger for women. For both men and women the serial correlation in
promotion rates is similar and we do not find that wage increases forecast
promotions. If we consider employer-reported promotions, there is a neg-
ative serial correlation in promotions for men, while only for women wage
increases predict promotions. For both men and women the results change
if we change the promotion concept. As one can see from Table 13 there are
no substantial differences between men and women in the estimated coeffi-
cients for the job separation rate. The results for the wage increases seem
to indicate that men select themselves more into job types where the re-
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turns to promotions are higher and where learning is more important. This
might imply that men work in occupations where unobserved ability is more
important in explaining the worker’s production function.
The final sensitivity analysis relates to the worker’s education. Education
is often considered as a signal about a worker’s ability. Furthermore, workers
with different levels of education sort themselves into different types of jobs.
We distinguish three types of workers, workers with only completed primary
education (low education), workers who completed the second or third ciclo
(medium education), and workers who completed high school or more (high
education).
The estimation results on the wage increases show that serial correlation
in wage increases is highest for the workers with low and high education (see
Table 14). For workers with medium education the serial correlation in wage
increases is small and insignificant. The wage increase upon promotion is sig-
nificant for all groups, but much higher for the workers with high education
than for both other groups. The workers with high education benefit most
from switching employers. The premium associated to an employer change
is twice the wage increase of a promotion. For both other groups the wage
increase upon switching employers is relatively small. These results imply
that the market for low educated workers is rather competitive, but that
learning is relatively important for these workers. An alternative explana-
tion is that wage for low educated workers are largely arranged by collective
bargaining agreements and that therefore switching employer does not yield
large wage increases. For the higher educated workers the market is less com-
petitive and learning is less important. This might be explained from the
fact that education levels are relatively low in Portugal. Since many people
(45%) do not have any education higher than primary school, the schooling
level of these individuals might not be a very good signal about their ability.
Those individuals who have higher levels of schooling distinguish themselves
from the majority of the population and therefore for them their educational
attainment corresponds relatively good to their ability.
For all educational levels we find serial correlation in promotion rates
(see Table 15). Also workers who switched employers are less likely to get
promoted in the following year. For the lowest educated workers, there is
17
a significant negative relation between wage increases in promotion rates.
This contradicts the learning model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999). For
the workers with medium and higher education wage increases do not have
a significant effect on promotion rates. Finally, for all groups we find sig-
nificant serial correlation in job separation rates (see Table 16). Promotions
and wage increases significantly increase the probability of switching employ-
ers, although these effects become smaller (and insignificant) as the level of
education increases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the dynamic relations between wage increases,
promotions and job changes. We have used the theoretical framework of
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) to construct empirical models for wage in-
creases, promotions and job changes. The model of Gibbons and Waldman
(1999) provides some testable implications on the importance of learning by
the employer about the worker’s ability. In the empirical analyses, using the
Portuguese matched employer-employee data Quadros de Pessoal, we mainly
focus on these testable implications.
In the empirical analyses we have used two definitions of promotions,
which are also often used in the literature. First, promotions defined as
changes in hierarchical levels, which is in line with the idea of a promotion
in the theoretical literature. Second, we used employer-reported promotions.
The wage returns to both types of promotions are substantial, although an
employer-reported promotion yields 30% higher returns. From the empirical
analyses we concluded that employer-reported promotions are mainly asso-
ciated to substantial wage increases rather than changes in the worker’s job
tasks or responsibilities. Wage increases upon switching employer are about
70% of the wage increase after a promotion. We interpret the substantial
wage increase when switching employers as evidence that the Portuguese
labor market is not competitive.
We find after controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
serial correlation in wage increases and in promotions. Gibbons and Wald-
man (1999) argue that under full information both types of serial correlation
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should be absent. We therefore conclude that employers learn about the
worker’s unobserved ability. Both wage increases and promotions increase
the rate at which workers switch employers. We have argued that this might
indicate that learning is asymmetric among employers. Only the current em-
ployer observed the workers productivity, other employers only observe the
occurrences of promotions and wage increases. Therefore, these (incomplete)
signals to the market may affect the rate at which workers change employers.
We have performed separate analyses for men and women and for dif-
ferent educational levels. The results seem to indicate that learning is more
important for men than for women, we find more state dependence in wage
increases for men and higher returns to promotions. This suggests that men
select themselves into occupations where the unobserved ability component
is more important in the worker’s production function. Finally, we find that
the labor market is more competitive for the lower educated workers. For
this group also learning about the worker’s ability is important. In Portugal
educational levels are very low compared to other countries. Therefore, hav-
ing a low level of education might be a very noisy signal about a worker’s
ability.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Description Mean
Monthly gross wage, constant (2000) PTE 125,762
Wage increase 5329
Promotions to higher hierarchical level 7.01%
Employer-reported promotions 11.18%
Job transitions to other firm 4.40%
Female 41.16%
Worker’s age (in years) 35.9
Tenure in the current firm (in years) 8.1
Number of workers in the firm 30
Level 1 Apprentices, interns, trainees 7.74%
Level 2 Non-qualified professionals 10.44%
Level 3 Semi-qualified professionals 18.27%
Level 4 Qualified professionals 47.42%
Level 5 Higher-qualified professionals 5.76%
Level 6 Supervisors, team leaders, foremen 4.36%
Level 7 Intermediary executives 2.82%
Level 8 Top executives 3.19%
Highest completed education
No complete primary school 2.88%
Completed primary school (4 years of education) 42.02%
6 years of education completed (second ciclo) 22.89%
9 years of education completed (third ciclo) 14.10%
High school completed (12 years of education) 13.74%
University completed (15 to 17 years of education) 4.37%
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Table 2: Frequency of mobility (in percentage).
Age No change Separation Transition Promotions Observations
Same level Higher level Lower level higher level same level
Men
16-25 67.01 4.29 3.23 1.96 11.91 11.59 62,763
26-35 78.05 3.45 1.41 1.16 6.17 9.76 138,046
36-45 83.48 2.25 0.57 0.59 4.39 8.73 123,484
46 - 87.22 1.31 0.23 0.31 3.24 7.68 137,269
Total 80.73 2.61 1.08 0.86 5.61 9.12 461,562
Women
16-25 68.42 3.83 2.33 1.83 12.04 11.55 58,740
26-35 79.57 2.64 1.07 1.09 6.28 9.36 113,723
36-45 84.69 1.54 0.48 0.59 4.71 7.99 87,483
46 - 87.42 0.94 0.21 0.29 3.95 7.19 56,223
Total 80.31 2.25 0.99 0.95 6.50 9.00 316,169
All 80.56 2.45 1.05 0.90 5.97 9.07 777,731
Table 3: Mobility (in percentage) and average wage per hierarchical level.
Level No change Separation Transition Promotion Average
higher level same level wage
Level 1 51.02 8.66 34.29 17.04 74,364
Level 2 77.70 5.92 12.80 6.89 86,548
Level 3 81.76 3.81 8.35 7.54 95,532
Level 4 83.88 4.23 2.55 9.41 117,795
Level 5 81.59 2.85 4.92 10.45 194,122
Level 6 86.37 2.42 3.39 7.37 177,693
Level 7 81.22 3.25 6.77 8.45 255,188
Level 8 84.56 3.58 10.70 361,278
Table 4: Job transition matrix within and across firms.
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8
Level 1 Fraction workers (%) 65.71 3.60 9.60 19.62 0.85 0.27 0.22 0.12
Wage increase (%) 6.32 12.54 11.52 12.92 13.87 20.51 23.95 25.98
Level 2 87.07 5.76 6.60 0.22 0.26 0.06 0.04
2.68 6.16 9.54 13.64 16.45 15.93 29.25
Level 3 91.45 7.53 0.42 0.46 0.09 0.05
2.79 6.10 8.25 11.13 12.38 19.61
Level 4 97.39 1.31 0.81 0.31 0.17
3.31 8.19 10.73 13.45 16.48
Level 5 94.82 1.22 2.65 1.31
4.42 6.77 8.57 12.31
Level 6 96.46 2.40 1.15
3.27 7.37 10.79
Level 7 92.69 7.31
5.30 9.65
Level 8 100.00
5.97
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Table 5: Estimation results for dynamic panel data model for wage increases
(wit − wit−1).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 0.104∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.098∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 0.080 0.091∗ 0.073 0.083∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Promotion (pit) 6488
∗∗∗ 6508∗∗∗ 8386∗∗∗ 8341∗∗∗
(476) (474) (521) (524)
Separation (sit) 4588
∗∗∗ 4643∗∗∗ 5693∗∗∗ 5768∗∗∗
(637) (632) (669) (663)
Age 377 323 368 283
(405) (395) (404) (395)
Age squared -2.87 -2.67 -3.25 -2.38
(2.88) (2.84) (2.86) (2.83)
Tenure -32 -20 -92 -56
(99) (97) (97) (96)
Tenure squared -2.15 0.127 2.15 2.19
(3.16) (3.21) (3.08) (3.17)
Number of workers in firm 0.468∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.074)
Hierarchical level yes yes yes yes
Sector, Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 329,218 329,218 329,218 329,218
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Table 6: Estimation results for dynamic panel data model for promotions
(pit).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) -5.16e-08 -7.88e-08 2.84e− 07∗∗ 1.98e-07
(1.01e-07) (1.01e-07) (1.44e-07) (1.44e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) -2.51e-08 -4.83e-08 3.27e− 07∗∗ 2.53e− 07∗
(9.60e-08) (9.56e-08) (1.38e-07) (1.38e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) −0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0275∗∗∗ −0.0273∗∗∗
(0.0035) (-4.83e-08) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Age 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0036 −0.0041∗
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Age squared −0.00048∗∗∗ −0.00050∗∗∗ -2.00e-06 4.80e-06
(0.000022) (0.000022) (0.000027) (0.000027)
Tenure 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ −0.0132∗∗∗ −0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00081) (0.00080) (0.00092) (0.00092)
Tenure squared −0.00040∗∗∗ −0.00038∗∗∗ 0.00041∗∗∗ 0.00038∗∗∗
(0.000024) (0.000025) (0.000041) (0.000040)
Number of workers in firm 7.95e− 07∗∗∗ −2.83e− 06∗∗
(3.69e-07) (1.12e-06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 329,218 329,218 329,218 329,218
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 7: Estimation results for dynamic panel data model for separations
(sit).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 1.38e− 06∗∗∗ 1.32e− 06∗∗∗ 1.37e− 06∗∗∗ 1.31e− 06∗∗∗
(1.30e-07) (1.25e-07) (1.29e-07) (1.24e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 1.34e− 06∗∗∗ 1.28e− 06∗∗∗ 1.33e− 06∗∗∗ 1.27e− 06∗∗∗
(1.22e-07) (1.17e-07) (1.21e-07) (1.17e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0829∗∗∗ 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Age −0.1427∗∗∗ −0.1411∗∗∗ −0.1432∗∗∗ −0.1416∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Age squared 0.00111∗∗∗ 0.00109∗∗∗ 0.00111∗∗∗ 0.00109∗∗∗
(0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000024)
Tenure 0.1371∗∗∗ 0.1363∗∗∗ 0.1370∗∗∗ 0.1362∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Tenure squared −0.00306∗∗∗ −0.00302∗∗∗ −0.00306∗∗∗ −0.00302∗∗∗
(0.000037) (0.000038) (0.000037) (0.000038)
Number of workers in firm 2.40e− 06∗∗∗ 2.31e− 06∗∗∗
(3.31e-07) (3.31e-07)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year No Yes No Yes
Observations 329,218 329,218 329,218 329,218
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Table 8: Estimation results (only years after 1993) for dynamic panel data
model for wage increases (wit − wit−1).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 0.135∗ 0.123
(0.080) (0.078)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 0.109 0.096
(0.074) (0.072)
Promotion (pit) 6699
∗∗∗ 9278∗∗∗
(642) (759)
Separation (sit) 6453
∗∗∗ 7675∗∗∗
(892) (951)
Age -129 -94
(618) (612)
Age squared -1.01 -1.21
(4.11) (4.09)
Tenure 137 120
(137) (136)
Tenure squared -7.92 -6.55
(5.02) (4.96)
Number of workers in firm 0.756∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.167)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes
Observations 217,784 217,784
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 9: Estimation results (only years after 1993) for dynamic panel data
model for promotions (pit).
Variable ∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 7.88e-08 1.16e− 06∗∗∗
(1.33e-07) (2.15e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 1.13e-07 1.21e− 06∗∗∗
(1.25e-07) (2.07e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.0070∗
(0.0024) (0.0041)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) −0.0107∗∗ −0.0216∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0048)
Age 0.0463∗∗∗ −0.0122∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0028)
Age squared −0.00045∗∗∗ 0.000069∗∗
(0.000029) (0.000029)
Tenure 0.0165∗∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Tenure squared −0.00041∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗
(0.000036) (0.000036)
Number of workers in firm -1.71e-06 −0.000017∗∗∗
(1.07e-06) (2.15e-06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes
Observations 217,784 217,784
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Table 10: Estimation results (only years after 1993) for dynamic panel data
model for separations (sit).
∆ hierachical level employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 1.31e− 06∗∗∗ 1.30e− 06∗∗∗
(1.69e-07) (1.69e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 1.25e− 06∗∗∗ 1.25e− 06∗∗∗
(1.58e-07) (1.57e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0016)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) 0.0809∗∗∗ 0.0826∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0054)
Age −0.1389∗∗∗ −0.1392∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Age squared 0.00100∗∗∗ 0.00100∗∗∗
(0.000036) (0.000036)
Tenure 0.1419∗∗∗ 0.1419∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Tenure squared −0.00299∗∗∗ −0.00299∗∗∗
(0.000061) (0.000061)
Number of workers in firm −5.15e− 06∗∗∗ −5.16e− 06∗∗∗
(1.31e-06) (1.31e-06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes
Observations 217,784 217,784
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 11: Estimation results (by gender) for dynamic panel data model for
wage increases (wit − wit−1).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported prom.
Female Male Female Male
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) -0.014 0.167∗∗ -0.020 0.160∗
(0.037) (0.083) (0.037) (0.082)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) -0.015 0.130∗ -0.022 0.123
(0.037) (0.076) (0.037) (0.075)
Promotion (pit) 4425
∗∗∗ 7833∗∗∗ 6007∗∗∗ 9779∗∗∗
(395) (763) (367) (866)
Separation (sit) 2495
∗∗∗ 6058∗∗∗ 3254∗∗∗ 7434∗∗∗
(649) (984) (655) (1046)
Age 301 441 304 332
(290) (700) (291) (703)
Age squared 0.5697 -5.13 0.6413 -4.42
(3.17) (4.54) (3.17) (4.54)
Tenure -3 -8 -22 -56
(111) (145) (111) (143)
Tenure squared -0.1162 -0.3867 1.29 2.11
(3.99) (4.50) (4.01) (4.41)
Number of workers in firm 0.660∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.151
(0.090) (0.097) (0.090) (0.100)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129,865 199,084 129,865 199,084
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Table 12: Estimation results (by gender) for dynamic panel data model for
promotions (pit).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
Female Male Female Male
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) -2.18e-07 -1.88e-07 5.75e− 07∗∗ 2.47e-08
(1.77e-07) (1.30e-07) (2.47e-07) (1.82e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) -1.93e-07 -1.50e-07 7.44e− 07∗∗∗ 3.26e-08
(1.70e-07) (1.23e-07) (2.41e-07) (1.73e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗ −0.0081∗
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0053) (0.0044)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) −0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0050 −0.0209∗∗∗ −0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0068) (0.0050)
Age 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗∗ −0.0099∗∗∗ 0.00061
(0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0031)
Age squared −0.00046∗∗∗ −0.00054∗∗∗ 0.000047 -0.000031
(0.000039) (0.000028) (0.000041) (0.000035)
Tenure 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ −0.0146∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Tenure squared −0.00046∗∗∗ −0.00035∗∗∗ 0.00032∗∗∗ 0.00043∗∗∗
(0.000048) (0.000029) (0.000059) (0.000050)
Number of workers in firm 7.36e-08 1.33e− 06∗∗∗ −6.13e− 06∗∗∗ -1.15e-06
(5.63e-07) (4.74e-07) (2.14e-06) (1.31e-06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129,865 199,084 129,865 199,084
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 13: Estimation results (by gender) for dynamic panel data model for
separations (sit).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
Female Male Female Male
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 1.28e− 06∗∗∗ 1.32e− 06∗∗∗ 1.27e− 06∗∗∗ 1.30e− 06∗∗∗
(1.80e-07) (1.68e-07) (1.79e-07) (1.67e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 1.26e-06 1.27e− 06∗∗∗ 1.24e− 06∗∗∗ 1.26e− 06∗∗∗
(1.76e-07) (1.56e-07) (1.75e-07) (1.56e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0016)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0822∗∗∗ 0.0861∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0053) (0.0065) (0.0053)
Age −0.1433∗∗∗ −0.1394∗∗∗ -0.1441 −0.1397∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0029)
Age squared 0.00111∗∗∗ 0.00107∗∗∗ 0.00111∗∗∗ 0.00107∗∗∗
(0.000040) (0.000031) (0.000040) (0.000031)
Tenure 0.1395∗∗∗ 0.1343∗∗∗ 0.1395∗∗∗ 0.1343∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Tenure squared −0.00312∗∗∗ −0.00295∗∗∗ −0.00312∗∗∗ −0.00295∗∗∗
(0.000065) (0.000047) (0.000065) (0.000047)
Number of workers in firm 1.25e− 06∗∗ 3.08e− 06∗∗∗ 1.15e− 06∗∗ 3.00e− 06∗∗∗
(5.61e-07) (4.13e-07) (5.61e-07) (4.13e-07)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129,865 199,084 129,865 199,084
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Table 14: Estimation results (by years of school) for dynamic panel data
model for wage increases (wit − wit−1).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
<= 4 years 6-9 years > 9 years <= 4 years 6-9 years > 9 years
Lagged wage increase 0.378∗ 0.073 0.282∗ 0.314 0.045 0.286∗
(wit−1 − wit−2) (0.209) (0.121) (0.167) (0.192) (0.115) (0.167)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 0.372∗ 0.055 0.214 0.308 0.026 0.214
(0.210) (0.118) (0.144) (0.192) (0.112) (0.144)
Promotion (pit) 5815
∗∗∗ 5819∗∗∗ 12286∗∗∗ 6932∗∗∗ 7277∗∗∗ 14645∗∗∗
(1050) (858) (2083) (1168) (938) (2077)
Separation (sit) 740 1796
∗∗ 23534∗∗∗ 1469∗ 2792∗∗ 26317∗∗∗
(778) (797) (4267) (795) (857) (4624)
Age -101 467 -685 38 453 -1077
(630) (439) (2095) (590) (438) (2160)
Age squared -3.90 -1.94 -15.97 -3.75 -0.7392 -13.35
(3.28) (6.63) (13.95) (3.23) (6.41) (14.04)
Tenure 28 50 14 -25 -3 82
(113) (162) (608) (109) (157) (616)
Tenure squared -1.36 -9.16 -1.83 0.8265 -6.23 -1.10
(3.63) (6.16) (19.46) (3.45) (5.88) (19.55)
Number of workers in firm 0.300∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.135 0.126∗ 0.436∗∗
(0.096) (0.068) (0.217) (0.094) (0.070) (0.223)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,583 122,086 54,549 152,583 122,086 54,549
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Table 15: Estimation results (by years of school) for dynamic panel data
model for promotions (pit).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
<= 4 years 6-9 years > 9 years <= 4 years 6-9 years > 9 years
Lagged wage increase −2.35e− 06∗∗ 7.46e-07 -1.08e-07 −4.82e− 06∗∗∗ 3.93e-07 2.95e-07
(wit−1 − wit−2) (9.58e-07) (4.82e-07) (1.93e-07) (1.57e-06) (5.79e-07) (2.70e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) −2.31e− 06∗∗ 7.41e-07 -8.87e-08 −4.90e− 06∗∗∗ 5.00e-07 3.24e-07
(9.65e-07) (4.73e-07) (1.69e-07) (1.58e-06) (5.69e-07) (2.45e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0095∗ −0.0621∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0060) (0.0051) (0.0070)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) −0.0098∗ −0.0124∗∗ -0.0137 −0.0178∗∗∗ −0.0219∗∗∗ −0.0617∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0086) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0100)
Age 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ -0.0067 -0.00070
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0040) (0.0077)
Age squared −0.00030∗∗∗ −0.00066∗∗∗ −0.00066∗∗∗ -0.000033 0.000024 -0.000060
(0.000028) (0.000045) (0.000076) (0.000033) (0.000051) (0.00010)
Tenure 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ −0.0112∗∗∗ −0.0147∗∗∗ −0.0183∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0029)
Tenure squared −0.00029∗∗∗ −0.00048∗∗∗ −0.00038∗∗∗ 0.00033∗∗∗ 0.00045∗∗∗ 0.00057∗∗∗
(0.000032) (0.000053) (0.000083) (0.000054) (0.000081) (0.00013)
Number of workers in firm 1.94e− 06∗∗∗ 7.64e-08 8.33e-07 −5.06e− 06∗∗ −4.74e− 06∗∗∗ 2.46e-06
(6.31e-07) (6.17e-07) (6.91e-07) (2.01e-06) (1.76e-06) (2.01e-06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,583 122,086 54,549 152,583 122,086 54,549
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
Table 16: Estimation results (by years of school) for dynamic panel data
model for separations (sit).
∆ hierarchical level employer-reported promotion
<= 4 years 6-9 years > 9 years <= 4 years 6-9 years > 9 years
Lagged wage increase 0.000015∗∗∗ 7.74e− 06∗∗∗ 3.24e-07 0.0929∗∗∗ 7.69e− 06∗∗∗ 3.26e-07
(wit−1 − wit−2) (2.52e-06) (1.15e-06) (2.12e-07) (0.0079) (1.14e-06) (2.12e-07)
Wage at t-2 (wit−2) 0.000015∗∗∗ 7.65e− 06∗∗∗ 2.90e-07 0.000015∗∗∗ 7.60e− 06∗∗∗ 2.92e-07
(2.54e-06) (1.13e-06) (1.90e-07) (2.47e-06) (1.12e-06) (1.90e-07)
Promotion at t-1 (pit−1) 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0079∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.0036
(0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0023)
Separation at t-1 (sit−1) 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0800∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0090) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0090)
Age −0.1381∗∗∗ −0.1743∗∗∗ −0.2206∗∗∗ −0.1378∗∗∗ −0.1746∗∗∗ −0.2216∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0048) (0.0073)
Age squared 0.00064∗∗∗ 0.00109∗∗∗ 0.00198∗∗∗ 0.00065∗∗∗ 0.00110∗∗∗ 0.00199∗∗∗
(0.000037) (0.000065) (0.00010) (0.000037) (0.000065) (0.00010)
Tenure 0.1213∗∗∗ 0.15536∗∗∗ 0.1706∗∗∗ 0.1210∗∗∗ 0.1552∗∗∗ 0.1707∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0033)
Tenure squared −0.00255∗∗∗ −0.00372∗∗∗ −0.00413∗∗∗ −0.00253∗∗∗ −0.00372∗∗∗ −0.00413∗∗∗
(0.000063) (0.000090) (0.00014) (0.000062) (0.000089) (0.00014)
Number of workers in firm 3.70e− 06∗∗∗ 3.19e-07 9.08e-07 3.54e− 06∗∗∗ 1.87e-07 8.73e-07
(1.06e-06) (6.33e-07) (5.95e-07) (1.06e-06) (6.37e-07) (5.95e-07)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,583 122,086 54,549 152,583 122,086 54,549
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.
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Appendix: Structure of the skill levels - Decreto-lei n. 121/78, 2nd June.
Level Tasks Skills
1 - Apprentices,
interns, trainees
Training for a specific task.
Identical, but without practice,
to the professional of the
qualification level
they will be assigned.
2 - Non-skilled
professionals
Simple tasks, diverse and usually
not specified, totally determined.
Practical knowledge and easily
acquired in a short time.
3 - Semi-skilled
professionals
Well defined tasks, mainly manual or
mechanical (no intellectual work)
with low complexity, usually routine
and sometimes repetitive.
Professional qualification in a limited
field or practical and elementary
professional knowledge.
4 - Skilled
professionals
Complex or delicate tasks and usually
not repetitive and defined by
the superiors.
Complete professional qualification
implying theoretical and applied
knowledge.
5 - Higher-skilled
professionals
Tasks requiring a high technical value
and defined in general terms
by the superiors.
Complete professional qualification
with a specialization adding to
theoretical and applied knowledge.
6 - Supervisors,
team leaders,
foremen
Orientation of teams, as directed by
the superiors, but requiring the
knowledge of action process.
Complete professional qualification
with a specialization.
7 - Intermediate executives
Organization and adaptation of the
guidelines established by the
superiors and directly linked with
the executive work.
Technical and professional
qualifications directed
to executive, research,
and management work.
8 - Top executives
Definition of the firm general policy
or consulting on the organization
of the firm. Strategic planning.
Creation or adaptation of technical,
scientific and administrative
methods or processes.
Knowledge of management and
coordination of firm’s fundamental
activities. Knowledge of management
and coordination of the fundamental
activities in the field to which the
individual is assigned and that requires
the study and research of high
responsibility and technical
level problems.
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